Judicial Review and the War on Terror by Yoo, John C.
 11/3/2003 1:02 PM 
1 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM  
John C. Yoo∗ 
Nowhere do academic arguments and government practice deviate more sharply than on the 
question of judicial review of war powers.  Throughout our history, Presidents and Congresses 
have struggled over the constitutional authority to initiate military hostilities.  Generally, the 
federal courts have refused to address this question on the merits, with the result that Presidents 
often have intervened abroad without a declaration of war or other authorization from Congress.  
The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which Congress enacted statutes authorizing the use 
of force, may be the exceptions that prove the rule.  In Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, the 
Persian Gulf, Grenada, Lebanon, and Korea, to name but a few, Presidents have ordered the use 
of force unilaterally, without congressional authorization or a declaration of war.1 
Academics almost uniformly criticize the President’s current primacy in war powers.  They 
argue that Congress’s power to declare war requires that the President receive a declaration of 
war or other statutory authorization before using force abroad.2  Despite their claims that much 
presidential warmaking has been unconstitutional, academics have reserved their sharpest attacks 
for the judiciary, which they have accused of “hypocrisy” for refusing to exercise judicial review 
over war powers questions.3  The basic claim is straightforward: Marbury v. Madison does not 
create an exception from judicial review for war powers.  At times, scholars have even taken the 
more direct approach of supporting lawsuits against presidential use of force and urging the 
courts to enjoin hostilities until Congress has given its approval.4 
In my earlier criticism of the conventional wisdom, I have argued that the Constitution 
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1 John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1673-74 (2000) 
[hereinafter Kosovo]; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 170 (1996) [hereinafter Continuation of Politics]. 
2 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 203 (1995); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIPLOMACY 81 (1990);; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 158–61 (1990); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1543, 1548 (2002); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 695, 700 (1997); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 158-61 (1990).  
3 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 30 (1992). 
4 See John C. Yoo, The Dogs That Didn’t Bark: Why Were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo?, 1 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 149, 150 (2000). 
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creates a flexible system for going to war, in which the President can initiate hostilities 
unilaterally, subject to congressional funding.5  In this work, I have argued that the Constitution 
does not provide the courts with a role in the decision to wage war; it textually allocates that 
power to the political branches.  As is evident elsewhere in this symposium, however, in separate 
work I have also argued that Marbury v. Madison correctly interpreted the Constitution as 
allowing the federal courts to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws, the practice we know today 
as judicial review.6 
In this essay, I explain that the exclusion of the federal courts from the question of war 
initiation is consistent with judicial review.  The Constitution does not give the federal courts a 
role in reviewing the initiation of hostilities because it has directly vested the authority to make 
that decision in the political branches.  By giving to Congress the power to “declare War,” the 
Constitution has vested the legislature, rather than the courts, with the juridical power to 
determine the legal status of a conflict with another nation.  Further, the Constitution does not 
create any specific process for going to war, unlike enacting statutes, making treaties, or 
appointing officers.  Rather, the Constitution allocates different war powers to the President and 
Congress, allowing them to shape warmaking through the interaction of these powers.  There is 
no role for judicial review because there is no single, constitutionally-required process for 
making war.  This view has been borne out in practice, as most recently demonstrated in the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.     
This is not to say, however, that the courts are completely ousted from any case involving 
war.  Federal courts still have a role to play with regard to the domestic effects of war, 
particularly when the war involves American citizens as enemies or when operations occur 
within the territory of the United States itself.  Part III of this paper will illustrate the wartime 
role of judicial review by examining cases arising from the current war against the al Qaeda 
terrorist organization.  In the context of surveillance, the federal courts have granted warrants 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),7 under more flexible standards than exist 
for a normal search warrant, to permit surveillance of terrorist suspects.  With American citizens 
detained as enemy combatants, the courts have entertained habeas corpus petitions, but have 
followed a deferential standard of scrutiny for the executive branch’s war making decisions.  
These cases show that while the courts have exercised judicial review over the consequences of 
the decision to go to war, they have adopted a more flexible, deferential standard of review than 
would apply to normal, peacetime governmental actions, in order to accommodate the 
imperatives of conducting war.  Thus, judicial review may apply to domestic wartime measures, 
but in a manner that provides options to the political branches for the conduct of the war, rather 
 
5 My textual and structural arguments can be found in John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1639 (2002) [hereinafter Constitutional Text]. 
6 See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review: Questions for the Critics, [forthcoming in 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (2003)]. 
7 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2000). 
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than simply serving as a negative check on government action. 
 
I. 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States went to war against the al 
Qaeda terrorist organization.  On that day, al Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial 
airliners and used them as guided missiles against the World Trade Towers in New York City 
and the Pentagon in the nation’s capital.  Resisting passengers brought down a fourth plane in 
Pennsylvania that appears to have been headed toward either the Capitol or the White House.  
The attacks caused about three thousand deaths, disrupted air traffic and communications within 
the United States, and caused the economy billions of dollars in losses.  Both the President and 
Congress have agreed these attacks marked the beginning of an armed conflict between the 
United States and the al Qaeda terrorist network.8  Indeed, al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks 
amounted to a classic decapitation strike designed to eliminate the political, military, and 
financial leadership of the country. 
The unconventional nature of the war, and of the enemy, has called upon the United States 
government to undertake a full spectrum of domestic and international responses.  Al Qaeda has 
both taken to the battlefield against the United States in somewhat conventional warfare, and 
sought to introduce covert cells of operatives into the United States to carry out surprise attacks 
on civilians.  It does not seek to defend or acquire any specific territory, and its personnel, 
material, and leadership moves through the open channels of the international economy.  In 
previous modern American conflicts, hostilities were limited to a foreign battlefield while the 
United States home front remained safe behind two oceans.  In this conflict, the battlefield can 
occur anywhere, and there can be no strict division between the front and home.  Nonetheless, an 
important dimension of the conflict has been the war abroad, in which the U.S. Armed Forces 
and the intelligence agencies have played an offensive role aimed at destroying the terrorist 
network.  In October, 2001, the United States launched a military campaign in Afghanistan that, 
within a few short weeks, rooted out al Qaeda from its bases and removed from power the 
Taliban militia that had harbored it.9  Subsequently, the United States conducted operations 
against al Qaeda terrorists in other parts of the world, such as the Philippines, Yemen, and parts 
of Africa.  It has detained hundreds of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters at the Naval Base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  In March 2003, motivated in part by Iraq’s suspected links to terrorist 
groups generally and al Qaeda specifically, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq and 
 
8 See President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in 
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 1(a) (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
9 For an earlier discussion of the legal issues surrounding the Afghanistan war, see Robert J.  Delahunty & John C. 
Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and 
the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2002). 
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removed Saddam Hussein from power.10 
But unlike previous conflicts, the war against al Qaeda also has a significant domestic 
dimension.  The initial salvo was launched by al Qaeda operatives against the United States from 
within the United States.  Al Qaeda shows no lessening in its efforts to pull off another attack 
within the United States on the scale of September 11.  The Justice Department has discovered 
Al Qaeda cells in cities such as Buffalo, New York and Portland, Oregon; detained a resident 
alien who had intended to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge; and intercepted at least one American 
citizen in Chicago who had planned to explode a radiological dispersal device, known as a “dirty 
bomb,” in a major American city.  After the attacks, the federal government investigated and 
detained hundreds of illegal aliens within the United States with possible links to the terrorists.  
Many were deported.  Two al Qaeda agents taken into custody within the United States have 
been designated as enemy combatants who are being detained without criminal charge until the 
end of the conflict.  Congress enacted legislation, the “USA Patriot Act,” to enhance the powers 
of the FBI and the intelligence community to defeat international terrorists within the United 
States,11 and created a new Department of Homeland Security to consolidate 22 separate 
domestic agencies with responsibilities for domestic security.12  After these legislative changes, 
the government engaged in an expanded surveillance effort to monitor the communications of 
terrorist targets under FISA. 
 
II. 
Examination of the military operations undertaken in the wake of the September 11 attacks 
demonstrates that the federal courts have no role in deciding whether the Congress or the 
President holds the power to begin wars.  As I will discuss in Part III, this stands in contrast with 
the role of the federal courts in domestic military and law enforcement operations in wartime.  
As I will argue, the absence of the courts in war matters abroad is dictated by constitutional text 
and structure, and hence lies outside the scope of judicial review as recognized in Marbury v. 
Madison. 
There are important textual and functional reasons why the courts should not inquire into the 
decision to initiate war.  First, the Constitution vests all of the enumerated powers over war to 
the other two branches.  Article II, Section 2 states that the “President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States.”13  He is further vested with all of “the 
 
10 Of course, the primary justifications for the war in Iraq were Hussein’s continuing possession of a weapons of 
mass destruction (“WMD”) program and his flouting of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.  See John 
Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, [forthcoming in 97 AM. J. INT’L L. (2003)]. 
11 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
12 Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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executive Power” and the duty to execute the laws.  These powers give the President broad 
constitutional authority to use military force in response to threats to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States.14  During the period leading up to the Constitution’s 
ratification, the Executive was understood to have the power to initiate hostilities and control 
conflict escalation.15 
 Congress has its own store of war powers.  Article I grants Congress the authority “to 
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water[,]” to raise, fund, and organize the military.16  Congress also enjoys other 
foreign affairs powers, such as the authority to regulate international commerce, to enact 
immigration laws, and to pass laws to punish piracy.17  While many have concluded that the 
Declare War power gives Congress the sole constitutional authority to decide whether to go to 
war, I have argued that the Constitution does not establish a specific legal process for beginning 
armed hostilities abroad.  Rather, the two sets of war powers enumerated in Articles I and II 
permit the political branches to contest for primacy in war matters within a flexible system of 
allocated constitutional powers. 
 By contrast, the Constitution does create a detailed, finely wrought procedure in which 
Congress plays the central role, namely lawmaking.  If a bill does not undergo bicameralism and 
presentment, the courts can readily determine that it is not a law.18  In foreign affairs, however, 
the Constitution does not establish a mandatory, detailed, congressionally driven procedure for 
taking action.  Rather, the Constitution vests the two branches with different powers--the 
President as Commander in Chief, Congress with control over funding and declaring war--
without requiring that they follow a specific process to make war.  Thus, the President may use 
his commander-in-chief and executive powers to use military force to protect the nation, subject 
to congressional appropriation and control over domestic legislation.  There is no role for judicial 
review because, unlike the legislative process, there is no clear, precise procedure that governs 
decisions on war.  By establishing this framework, the Framers expected that the process for 
making war would be more flexible and capable of quicker, more decisive action, than the 
legislative process. 
 Of course, a critic of this approach could respond that the area of war powers is textually no 
different than any other constitutional provision.  There may be no specific constitutional 
 
14 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 776 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(stating that the “inherent powers” of the Commander in Chief “are clearly extensive.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (noting that the President has authority to deploy United States armed forces “abroad or to any 
particular region”); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (“As commander-in-chief, [the President] is 
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ 
them in the manner he may deem most effectual . . . .”). 
15 See Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 1, at 196-241. 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
17 See id.  
18 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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authorization for judicial review over war powers, but there is also no explicit textual 
authorization for any other constitutional provision, yet we accept judicial review over most 
other constitutional questions.  If that is the case, judicial review should extend to war powers 
just as it extends to the limits on Congress’s interstate commerce powers or to the scope of the 
First Amendment.  None of those clauses contains any special role for courts, so if judicial 
review extends to those areas it should reach war powers as well.  Indeed, Professor Thomas 
Franck claims that Marbury v. Madison requires that the courts address war powers disputes, and 
that judicial refusal to hear such cases has exempted the President from “the normal judicial 
umpiring process” that applies to his actions at home.19 
 This brings me to my second point.  Generally, as I have argued in this symposium and in 
earlier work with Professor Prakash, the courts have the duty to refuse to enforce 
unconstitutional legislation--in other words, the power of judicial review.20  We have argued that 
the constitutional text, structure, and history dictate that the courts play this function, and have 
criticized others, such as Professors Kramer, Choper, and Wechsler, for arguing that the 
Constitution exempts whole categories of issues, such as federalism, from judicial review.  We 
have argued that neither the constitutional text nor structure creates any broad categorical 
exceptions, such as federalism, to judicial review.  A critic could argue that this view of judicial 
review is inconsistent with the argument that the courts are excluded from cases concerning the 
power to begin wars. 
 The question of the initiation of wars, however, is fundamentally different than that of 
judicial review over federalism questions.  An initial and obvious point of distinction is that 
whether judicial review extends to a specific issue, such as the power to begin war, or the power 
to impeach, is a far narrower question than whether judicial review reaches all federalism 
questions or all separation of powers issues.  The constitutional text or structure does not exclude 
such broad categories from judicial review.  Unlike my colleague Jesse Choper, I have not yet 
reached the conclusion that all separation of powers issues must remain immune from judicial 
review.21  Whether judicial review extends to a more discrete question, such as the initiation of 
war, will depend on the Constitution’s specific textual and structural distribution of authority on 
that issue.  If the power to determine a certain constitutional question has been committed solely 
to the authority of one or both of the other branches, then the political question doctrine in its 
most narrow, “classical” form will preclude the exercise of judicial review.  While this essay is 
not the place to engage in an extended analysis of the appropriateness of the political question 
doctrine, it should not be forgotten that the very case cited for the creation of judicial review also 
first recognized what we today know as the political question doctrine.  As Chief Justice 
 
19 FRANCK, supra note 3, at 4. 
20 Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887; Saikrishna B. Prakash 
and John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001); 
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
21 JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 295-96 (1980). 
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Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, “[b]y the constitution of the United States, the President 
is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own 
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own 
conscience.”22  When these powers are involved, Marshall observed, “whatever opinion may be 
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can 
exist, no power to control that discretion.  The subjects are political.  They respect the nation, not 
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is 
conclusive.”23 
 Narrow application of the political question doctrine  extends only to specific questions over 
which the Constitution has textually granted the final power of determination to the other 
branches; it does not imply the exclusion of judicial review over a whole category of cases.  
Impeachment illustrates this point.  In Nixon v. United States, Judge Walter Nixon challenged the 
constitutionality of the Senate’s decision to delegate the function of collecting evidence during 
the impeachment trial to a committee.24  The Court held the suit non-justiciable because Article I 
gives the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments,”25 which it read to give the power of 
decision on procedure and substance over impeachment to the Senate alone, without subsequent 
review by the courts.26  Finding that judicial review does not extend to impeachments, however, 
does not arise from a general refusal to adjudicate all separation of powers disputes.  Rather, 
judicial review does not apply to the discrete issue of impeachment because of the Constitution’s 
textual allocation of authority over it to the political branches.  Courts can still decide questions 
about the independent counsel or the legislative veto, even if they cannot hear cases about 
impeachment. 
 Similar to the impeachment power, the Constitution has excluded the courts from the 
specific question of war by textually conferring the power of decision elsewhere.  In cases 
challenging the constitutionality of presidential warmaking, plaintiffs argue that a current state of 
affairs constitutes a “war,” and that Congress therefore must authorize the use of force before the 
President can begin hostilities.   The Declare War Clause, however, vests in Congress the 
authority to declare, or, in other words to define, the legal relationship between the United States 
and another country.  Like a declaratory judgment, a declaration of war represents the judgment 
of Congress that a certain state of relations between the United States and another country 
amounts to war under international law.27  At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, a 
declaration of war itself was not linked to the start of military hostilities, and had generally fallen 
into disuse.28  A declaration of war established the formal, legal relationship between the two 
 
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 165-66 (1803). 
23 Id. at 166. 
24 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
26 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230. 
27 I have made this argument in more detail in Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 1, at 204-08. 
28 Id. at 214-17. 
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nations in conflict and defined the domestic legal status of certain wartime actions.  A 
historically relevant example is the Declaration of Independence.  The Declaration did not 
authorize hostilities with Great Britain, which had begun a year earlier, but instead recognized 
the legal independence and sovereignty of the former colonies and the state of hostilities with the 
mother country.29 
 Rather than giving the job of determining the international legal status of the United States 
to the courts, the Constitution vests in Congress the authority to determine whether the nation is 
legally at war.  The Declare War power vests in Congress a juridical function of deciding 
whether a certain state of affairs constitutes a war for constitutional and legal purposes.   When 
understood in this manner, an analysis that excludes judicial review over the initiation of war 
parallels the Court’s reasoning in Nixon.  With impeachment, the Constitution vests the juridical 
function of trying a government official in the Senate.  Because the Constitution in these two 
cases has chosen to delegate a *judicial function* to the legislature, it makes no sense for the 
courts to review these decisions. 
 Even if courts were to address the merits of a war, they would not have available any 
constitutionally-compelled process to impose on the political branches.  This is not to say that 
there are no “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving”30 a dispute over 
war powers--the prudential version of the political question doctrine.  A court could find a 
manageable standard by requiring that any use of force receive congressional authorization first.  
The point here is different.  It is not that courts could not functionally create a principled 
standard capable of application in war powers, but rather that the Constitution itself demands 
none.  This can be most clearly seen by comparing the structure of the war power to that of other 
governmental functions.  When the Constitution creates a process that requires step-by-step 
approval by either the executive and legislative branches, it explicitly does so.  Thus, with 
appointments and treaties, Article II, Section 2 clearly gives the President the initiative in 
appointments by begin the process with the nomination of officers, and in treatymaking, by 
allowing the President to negotiate treaties.31  But it also requires senatorial “advice and consent” 
before either process can be formally completed.32  With regard to statutes, Article I, Section 7 
carefully delineates the qualified veto of the President, along with the process of House and 
Senate approval.33  It is relatively easy for courts to monitor compliance with lawmaking, 
treatymaking, or appointing officers, because the Constitution sets out clear rules to govern the 
process. 
 
29 See generally David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 39 
(2002); Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 5, at 1671. 
30 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
31  U.S. CONST. art. II., §2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at art. I, §7. 
 
 11/3/2003  1:02 PM 
 TERRORISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9 
 This stands in sharp contrast with the war power.  The Constitution does not set out any 
process for going to war.  Consider the questions that arise just over Congress’s power to declare 
war.  May the President sign a declaration of war?  Must he?  Must a declaration of war be 
proposed by the President?  Is it subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of 
Article I, Section 7?  Can the President veto a declaration, and can Congress override it?  Must a 
declaration precede hostilities?  Can it come after hostilities?  Could it never come at all, even 
though hostilities have proceeded?  Can statutes serve as the functional equivalent of a 
declaration of war?  The Constitution does not answer any of these questions because it fails to 
set out any specific process for going to war.  Compare this to the Constitution’s treatment of, for 
example, a revenue bill.  Revenue bills must originate in the House, be approved by both House 
and Senate, and then signed by the President within a certain period of days.34  If he vetoes the 
bill, then a supermajority of Congress may enact it into law anyway.35  With regard to revenue 
bills, the Constitution establishes a specific process with clear rules and a step-by-step order, one 
which provides a rule of decision for courts to review.36  Even in areas where the Constitution 
has diluted the once sole executive authority over a certain subject, such as treaties or 
appointments, it still sets out a specific process.  This is particularly telling because in regard to 
treaties and appointments, the Constitution allocates different roles to the President and Senate in 
exactly the way that many academics believe ought to apply to the war power.  Yet, the 
Constitution is utterly silent when it comes to a process for warmaking.   
 With regard to the war power, there simply is no process established by the Constitution that 
the branches must follow.  Rather, the Constitution allocates different war powers to the two 
branches without any specified process that determines their interaction.  Article II, for example, 
vests full control of the United States military forces in the President.  The power of the 
President is at its zenith under the Constitution when directing military operations of the armed 
forces because the power of Commander in Chief is assigned solely to the President.  In The 
Prize Cases, for example, the Court explained that “[w]hether the President in fulfilling his 
duties as Commander in Chief[]” was justified in treating the southern States as belligerents and 
instituting a blockade, was a question “to be decided by him[.]”37  The Court could not question 
the merits of his decision, but must leave evaluation to “the political department of the 
Government to which this power was entrusted.”38  As the Court observed, the President enjoys 
full discretion in determining what level of force to use.39 
 
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, §7 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). 
37 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (“He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.”) (internal quotations omitted); see Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1949)(“Certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private 
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 Congress has power over funding, and can thus deprive the President of any forces to 
command.  Indeed, by setting the size, armament, and capabilities of the armed forces, Congress 
can determine the type, place, and duration of conflicts that the executive can wage.  If Congress 
wants to prevent the President from waging offensive wars, or wars abroad, it can appropriate 
forces sufficient only for homeland and coastal defense, as it did for much of the early 19th 
century.  Through the declare war power, Congress can determine the legal status of 
presidentially-ordered military action.  It could conceivably prevent the military from enjoying 
the benefits and protections of the laws of war, if it so chose.40 
 Viewing war powers in this manner explains why the political question doctrine applies to 
war but not perhaps to other separation of powers cases.  Some have argued, such as my 
colleague Jesse Choper, that judicial review should not extend to separation of powers disputes 
because the executive and legislative branches have sufficient tools at their disposal to defend 
themselves from encroachments by the other branches.41  This observation concerning the 
distribution of authorities between executive and legislative is no doubt true of war powers as it 
is many other areas.  Nonetheless, the Court has adjudicated many disputes between the 
President and Congress, with notable examples being the deficit reduction act in Bowsher v. 
Synar,42 the legislative veto in I.N.S. v. Chadha,43 the independent counsel law in Morrison v. 
Olson,44 and the U.S. Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v. United States.45  Judicial review 
 
litigation—even by a citizen—which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-
Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.”); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ 
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the 
world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify 
actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.”); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 
1500, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (arguing that majority should 
deny injunctive relief to plaintiffs because it would require the President to take the court into its confidence 
regarding military operations); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 922 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816) 
(“[U]nder this power where there is no express legislative declaration, the president is guided solely by his own 
judgment and discretion . . . .”); Hefleblower v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 228, 238 (Ct. Cl. 1886) (“The responsibility 
of declaring what portions of the country were in insurrection and of declaring when the insurrection came to an end 
was accorded to the President; when he declared a portion of the country to be in insurrection the judiciary cannot 
try the issue and find the territory national; conversely, when the President declared the insurrection at an end in any 
portion of the country, the judiciary cannot try the issue and find the territory hostile.”); cf. United States v. Chem. 
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 12 (1926) (“It was peculiarly within the province of the Commander-in-Chief to know the 
facts and to determine what disposition should be made of enemy properties in order effectively to carry on the 
war.”). 
40 Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 7 (1801); Bas v. 
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
41 Choper, supra note 21, at 305-08. 
42 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
43 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
44 Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
45 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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may appropriately extend to such cases, however, when it does not to war powers.  These cases 
involved areas in which the Constitution sets out a specific process for government action, such 
as the enactment of legislation or the appointment of federal officers.  Courts must review 
whether the branches have followed the prescribed procedures to determine whether the final 
government actions themselves are valid.  War powers would not fall into the same category, 
however, because there is no constitutionally-mandated governmental process, and hence no 
room or need for judicial review. 
 Events since the September 11, 2001 attacks have borne out these principles.   President 
Bush’s decision to use force in Afghanistan does not appear to have been challenged in court.  
Such a lawsuit, if brought by a member of Congress, most likely would have failed on the merits.  
On September 18, 2001, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the President to use military 
force against “those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons[.]”46  The President responded to the September 11 attacks by ordering 
the use of force against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbored it in Afghanistan.  There 
could have been some challenge to the Afghanistan conflict: that the conflict was a “war” within 
the meaning of Article I, Section 8, and that therefore Congress must issue a declaration of war; 
a statutory authorization is no substitute.  No court, however, appears to have been confronted 
with these arguments in any direct challenge to the legality of the conflict. 
 Instead, the legality of the war with al Qaeda has arisen in actions challenging the detention 
of Americans captured fighting in league with the enemy.  In these cases, the courts have refused 
to second-guess whether the nation is at war, but instead have deferred to the judgment of the 
political branches.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was born in Louisiana but 
grew up in Saudi Arabia, was captured in Afghanistan fighting on the side of the Taliban 
militia.47  Hamdi’s father, acting as his next friend, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
seeking his release because he was not held on criminal charges.48  In dismissing the writ, Judge 
Wilkinson, writing for a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel, did not question whether the United 
States was in a state of armed conflict in Afghanistan, nor whether that war was properly 
authorized under the Constitution.49  Indeed, the court emphasized that its role was limited to 
reviewing whether the executive branch had properly classified Hamdi as an enemy combatant, 
under the standards set out by Ex Parte Quirin, and hence could be detained under the laws of 
war until the end of the conflict.  As Judge Wilkinson wrote, “the political branches are best 
positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context, and neither the absence of set-piece 
battles nor the intervals of calm between terrorist assaults suffice to nullify the warmaking 
 
46 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
47 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir.), en banc rehearing denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002). 
48 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 450. 
49 Id. 
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authority entrusted to the executive and legislative branches[].”50  The Fourth Circuit limited the 
scope of its review not to whether the war was properly begun, which was a decision for the 
political branches, but to the legal ramifications of the decision to go to war.51 
 A similar result obtained in the lawsuits arising out of the detentions of captured alien enemy 
combatants at Guantanamo Bay.  In two separate actions, those representing (or claiming to 
represent) aliens captured in Afghanistan and held by the military at the naval station at 
Guantanamo Bay filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus.52  In one case, brought by lawyers 
and clergy, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing, because none of the 
plaintiffs could show injury in fact or any actual relationship with the detainees.53  In the second 
lawsuit brought in the D.C. Circuit by relatives of some of the detainees, however, standing was 
not a barrier.54  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Randolph dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction.55  He relied upon Johnson v. Eisentrager,56 which had held in the aftermath of 
World War II that German prisoners of war held by the military abroad had no constitutional 
rights against the federal government and no ability to seek a writ of habeas corpus.57  As Judge 
Randolph observed, “the Guantanamo detainees have much in common with the German 
prisoners in Eisentrager.   They too are aliens, they too were captured during military operations, 
they were in a foreign country when captured, they are now abroad, they are in the custody of the 
American military, and they have never had any presence in the United States.”58  Following the 
logic of  cases subsequent to Eisentrager, most notably United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,59 the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that no court could exercise jurisdiction over the detainees, “even if they 
have not been adjudicated enemies of the United States[,]” simply because they were aliens held 
outside the territorial United States.60  Again, the Court did not question whether a state of war 
had begun, or whether the government had chosen war in the appropriate manner, but instead 
focused on the legal ramifications of those decisions as made by the political branches. 
 
50 Id. at 464 (citations omitted). 
51 See id.  In Padilla v. Bush, Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York, reviewing the detention of Jose 
Padilla, similarly concluded that the decision whether the United States was in a legal state of armed conflict rested 
wholly with the President, and was not an issue fit for judicial review.  Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 589 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring)). 
52 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
53 Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162-64. 
54 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1137-38. 
 
55 Id. 1141. 
56 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
57 Id. 
 
58 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140. 
59 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). 
60 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141. 
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 Unlike the conflict in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq prompted a more direct challenge to the 
manner in which the political branches decided to wage war.  Like the Afghanistan conflict, 
Congress enacted legislation supporting the President’s authority to use force in Iraq.  In an 
October 2002 joint resolution, Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to 
enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions and to protect the national security of the 
United States.61  Nonetheless, military personnel and members of the House of Representatives 
brought suit claiming that an invasion would violate the resolution and that Congress had 
unconstitutionally delegated its power to declare war.62  Finding that the case was unripe, the 
First Circuit dismissed the case.63  Key to its holding was that even if an invasion were to occur, 
whether jurisdiction would exist would depend on whether Congress takes action to oppose the 
President, and thus create a ripe constitutional confrontation.64  In this respect, the First Circuit 
did not venture as far as other courts, such as the D.C. Circuit, which have suggested that inter-
branch disputes over war powers would be completely precluded from judicial review.65  In any 
event, the First Circuit, like every court confronted by an inter-branch dispute over war powers, 
declined to reach the merits. 
 To be sure, this model of war powers may not appeal to everyone, especially those 
unconvinced by reliance on the original understanding or arguments based solely on the 
constitutional text and structure.  At the very least, however, this Part demonstrates that original 
understanding arguments do not support the notion that the Constitution requires a system in 
which Congress authorizes all wars ex ante.  If we are left without a compelling textual or 
structural argument either, then a purely functional approach is left in the same position as the 
conclusion reached in this article: that the Constitution leaves the arrangement of the war power 
up to the political branches.  It would be difficult for a functionalist to argue that a different 
result ought to obtain than the war powers system we have today, in which the President initiates 
war, Congress funds it, and the courts remain aloof.  The war powers system that has prevailed 
since the end of World War II, if not before, represents the consistent judgments of Presidents, 
congressmen, and judges for more than 50 years about the best way to structure war powers.  A 
functionalist would have no better information about the most effective institutional design for 
war powers than that available to the political branches themselves; certainly no court would 
have any better information.  In light of that gap in information, a functionalist ought to defer to 
the institutional choice of the political branches.  Someone moved by the historical, textual, and 
structural arguments made here, of course, would also accept historical practice, so long as it 
 
61 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 50 U.S.C. §1541 (2002) 
62 John Doe I v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 
63 Id. at 137. 
 
64 Id. at 139. 
 
65 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-28 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
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falls within the broad range of possible warmaking systems permitted by the interaction of the 
branches’ core powers. 
 The Bush administration’s decision to seek congressional authorization for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq would not disrupt this convergence.  For a functionalist, 2001 and 2003 
may mark the beginning of a new practice in which Presidents turn to ex ante congressional 
authorization before using force.  A return of formal congressional participation may become the 
norm because of the unique challenges created by the war on terrorism, which spans both foreign 
and domestic battlefields, and the enormous resources needed for the war in Iraq.  It would 
represent the best judgment of the political branches that a Congress-first institutional design 
better suits the types of undertakings posed by the war on terrorism.  If one believes, as I do, that 
the constitutional text, structure, and history permit a variety of different warmaking processes, 
this practice certainly falls within the range permitted by the Constitution. 
   
III. 
The exclusion of judicial review from the decision for war does not exclude the courts 
completely from reviewing the prosecution of war.  When the war effort involves domestic 
affairs or, unfortunately, operations within the territorial United States, courts may be called 
upon by the political branches to play a role.  When it comes to war, the federal courts in their 
own way can serve as a weapon against a national enemy.  This is illustrated by the current war 
against the al Qaeda terrorist network, which launched its deadliest and most successful attack 
directly on American soil, a feat it appears determined to repeat.  First, as in the Civil War and 
World War II, American citizens have joined the enemy and returned to attack the United States.  
Their capture and detention may require the federal courts to review the circumstances of their 
capture and the legal basis for their continuing detention.  Second, efforts designed to frustrate 
and disrupt the al Qaeda network may prove most effective when using the tools and methods of 
law enforcement which may require the participation of the courts.  In this Part, we will explore 
the judicial role in the prosecution of war by examining the surveillance of terrorist suspects and 
their capture and detention. 
Two points emerge from examining the role of the courts in the domestic front against al 
Qaeda.  First, the judicial process can provide an alternate method for fighting terrorism that may 
prove more effective than regular, military efforts.  For example, in some cases it may make 
more sense to use the familiar tools of law enforcement:  a warrant to arrest and search, 
indictment and prosecution, and, eventually, trial.  In other cases, however, it may prove more 
effective to follow the military model, which allows for the detention of enemy combatants 
without trial.  Second, in order to perform this function the courts have developed a different 
standard of review that rejects the de novo standard applied to many questions raised during the 
regular operations of the domestic criminal justice system.  Recent cases in the war against al 
Qaeda suggest that courts are following a deferential approach which, while not adopting the 
complete deference applied to the decision to initiate war, attempts to accommodate the 
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imperatives of the warfighting system so that effective means can be employed to combat al 
Qaeda at home. 
 
1. Surveillance 
Surveillance of terrorists could be undertaken within two distinct legal regimes.  The first is 
the regular criminal justice system, in which the government may seek a warrant to conduct 
surveillance of a terrorist suspect’s voice or electronic communications by presenting sufficient 
evidence of probable cause to an Article III judge.66  Surveillance undertaken in this manner 
would be no different than that used against organized crime groups or drug cartels operating 
within the United States.  A second method, however, could present itself when terrorists 
undertake direct operations within the territorial United States.  During wartime the military 
engages in searches and surveillance abroad without a warrant.  We do not, for example, require 
the armed forces to seek a warrant when it conducts visual or electronic surveillance of enemy 
forces or of a battlefield, or when it searches buildings, houses, and vehicles for the enemy.67  
Nor must military operations within the United States operate under a different rule.  Were 
enemy forces to actually invade and operate on the territory of the United States, the Constitution 
would not require a search warrant for the military to conduct surveillance of the enemy.  Every 
search or observation of confederate forces during the Civil War, for example, did not require a 
warrant.  Therefore, if al Qaeda forces organize and carry out missions to attack civilian or 
military targets within the United States, government surveillance of terrorists would not be 
characterized as law enforcement so much as military operations.  In such circumstances, when 
the government is not pursuing an ordinary criminal law enforcement objective, the Fourth 
Amendment requires no search warrant.68  Although not yet recognized by the Supreme Court,69 
lower federal courts have held that searches undertaken to protect the national security are not 
subject to the warrant requirement in the context of domestic surveillance for counter-
intelligence purposes. 70   
Yet, searches authorized under the Fourth Amendment warrant clause can have an important 
advantage over information gathered through the military’s warmaking function.  The former can 
be used in the criminal justice system, and presumptively could be admitted in court.  The latter, 
 
66 18 U.S.C. § §  2510-2522 (2000). 
67 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273-75 (concluding that Fourth Amendment did not protect nonresident aliens 
against unreasonable searches or seizures conducted outside the sovereign territory of the United States, because of 
serious detriment to armed forces abroad). 
68 This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s recent “special needs” cases, which allow reasonable, 
warrantless searches for government needs that go beyond regular law enforcement.  See Vernonia School Dist. 47J 
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (random drug-testing of student athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 447-55 (1990) (highway sobriety checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 
(1976) (border control checkpoints). 
69 United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972). 
70 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir.  1980);  
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however, might not prove admissible in a civilian prosecution, as the searches might not have 
been undertaken on probable cause and would not have received ex ante judicial approval.  In 
certain circumstances, the government may wish to incapacitate al Qaeda members through the 
use of the criminal justice system, rather than through capture and detention by the military.  
While conducting surveillance via the warrant process may prove the best way to permit the 
prosecution of terrorists, it has significant shortcomings in this context.  A search warrant 
requires probable cause that “‘the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or 
conviction’ for a particular offense.”71  Warrants, in other words, are usually granted on a 
probable cause standard that is retrospective:  it is aimed at helping to solve a crime that has 
already taken place.  A successful anti-terrorism operation, however, should be prospective:  it 
should prevent or disrupt the terrorist cell before it attacks.  Surveillance will need to take place 
not because the government believes  evidence of a past crime to be present, but because it 
suspects that certain individuals are linked to al Qaeda and may undertake future terrorist attacks. 
This discussion may lead one to believe that the legal regime governing searches simply 
presents the government with a binary choice.  It can operate within the civilian system of Fourth 
Amendment warrants and prosecution, or it can make use of the more flexible standards for 
military surveillance, forsaking the benefits of the criminal justice system.  The courts, however, 
have been called upon, by Congress, to develop a different approach that seeks to avoid this 
dilemma.  In response to the revelation of warrantless national security searches, Congress 
enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.72  FISA created a foreign 
intelligence surveillance court, known as the “FISC,” made up of Article III district judges drawn 
from around the country, which could issue a warrant to conduct a search for foreign intelligence 
information.  The FISC may issue a search warrant if “there is probable cause to believe that . . . 
the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power[.]”73  
The definition of foreign power includes international terrorist organizations.74  FISA permits an 
ex ante search warrant not based on a showing that a target was involved with criminal activity, 
but on probable cause that the target was linked to a terrorist organization.75  FISA proceedings 
 
71 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)). 
72 50 U.S.C. § §  1801-62 (2000).  FISA and its legislative history are extensively analyzed in the first and only 
decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, composed of Judges Guy, Silberman, and Leavy.  
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722-28 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). 
73 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2000). 
74 FISA defines a foreign power, in part, as “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation 
therefor” and “a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons[.]”  50 
U.S.C. § §  1801(a)(4),(5). 
75 For targets who are United States persons, the standard is higher and approaches that of a Fourth Amendment 
warrant.  See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737-42.  FISA requires that the information sought, if concerning a 
United States person, is related to the ability of the United States to protect against(A) actual or potential attack or 
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage or international terrorism by 
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;  or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service 
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power[.]” 50 §  1801(e)(1).  As the FISA Court of Review 
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are held ex parte, with only the government represented, in a closed hearing so that classified 
information can be discussed with the judges while protecting intelligence sources and methods.  
At the same time, the warrant permits a search whose fruits may be used in a subsequent 
prosecution. 
FISA represents an effort by the political branches to promote judicial involvement in 
fighting threats to national security.  At the same time, it seeks to convince the courts to abandon 
the usual de novo review and adopt a standard of review that accommodates both national 
security needs and the option for use by law enforcement and prosecutors.  It creates a statutory 
mechanism that grants national security warrants, but under a standard below that used for 
Fourth Amendment warrants, at least with regard to non-United States persons.  Unlike military 
searches, however, the fruits of these searches will prove presumptively admissible in 
prosecutions.  This allows the federal courts to offer another option to the political branches, that 
of prosecution and trial, in the war against the al Qaeda terrorist organization. 
The courts have accepted this role.  It appears that no court has found FISA to be 
unconstitutional.  Initially, the courts erected a barrier between searches conducted for 
intelligence gathering and law enforcement by means of the “primary purpose” test, which 
required that the primary purpose of a FISA search was to collect foreign intelligence, rather than 
to engage in the investigation of ordinary crime.76  The FISC enforced this approach by limiting 
contact, and therefore preventing intelligence sharing, between intelligence and domestic law 
enforcement personnel on FISA investigations.77  The judiciary’s wall of separation between 
foreign intelligence and law enforcement represented an attempt to contain the warrantless 
national security approach so as not to contaminate the criminal justice system, based as it is on 
warrants for the conduct of searches. 
It is doubtful that the court’s interpretation of FISA was correct.  Although FISA required a 
national security official to certify that “the purpose” of the surveillance was to collect foreign 
intelligence in order to receive a FISA warrant,78 this ultimately had little to do with the uses to 
which that intelligence was put.  In other words, if the executive branch wanted to collect 
intelligence because it represented a foreign threat to national security, its purpose would be 
consistent with FISA even if it decided that the most effective use of that information is criminal 
investigation and trial.  Further, as the FISA Court of Review concluded, Congress’s 
understanding when it enacted FISA was that criminal prosecution could help in the prevention 
 
observed, this showing is functionally similar to probable cause that the target is engaged in criminal 
activity.**citation needed 
76 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725-27. 
77 See id. at 720-21.  As the Appeals Court observed, however, the idea for the wall of separation between 
intelligence and law enforcement appears to have originated in the Justice Department in 1995, apparently in 
response to circuit court decisions that demanded that FISA investigations be for the “primary purpose” of collecting 
foreign intelligence information.  Id. at 727-36. 
78 50 U.S.C. § 1804. 
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of foreign threats to national security.79   
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, this dichotomy broke down.  The terrorist attacks 
represented both a foreign threat to the national security and a violation of federal criminal laws 
against terrorism.  The political branches sought again to convince the judiciary to develop a 
more flexible approach that would allow the government to benefit from the warrantless nature 
of national security searches.  In the Patriot Act, Congress amended FISA to require that the 
government certify only that a “significant purpose” of the search is to collect foreign 
intelligence, clearly an attempt to reverse the judiciary’s misinterpretation of FISA to preclude 
cooperation between the foreign intelligence and law enforcement communities.80  The federal 
courts responded by eliminating the wall between foreign intelligence and law enforcement and 
moving the FISA system toward a more flexible approach.  In its first decision ever, the FISA 
Court of Appeals reversed the FISC’s attempt to keep law enforcement and foreign intelligence 
separate after September 11, although it indicated this had returned FISA to its original meaning 
and that the Patriot Act amendment was unnecessary.81 
Not only did the Court find that no such separation was warranted by FISA, but it suggested 
that FISA warrants themselves are not “warrants” in the Fourth Amendment sense, as they do not 
require a showing of probable cause of criminal activity.  The Court of Review found that, 
assuming that FISA warrants were not true warrants, they would still be constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment because their use would fall within the exception for warrantless searches in 
cases  where the government conducts the searches for important interests other than ordinary 
law enforcement (special needs cases).82  In other words, the Court of Review found FISA 
searches to be constitutional as warrantless national security searches, yet also upheld FISA in 
such a way that would allow the fruits of the searches to be used in a criminal prosecution.  
Judicial review would extend to the searches, but deference to the political branches meant that 
they would enjoy more flexible constitutional standards. 
 
2. Enemy Combatants 
A similar choice between absolute deference to the political branches and full de novo 
judicial review has developed with regard to the detention of enemy combatants.  The laws of 
war have long allowed nations to capture and detain members of the enemy armed forces.  The 
detention of enemy combatants until the end of the conflict prevents them from re-joining the 
battle against a nation and allows the gathering of intelligence about the plans and activities of 
the enemy.  As the laws of war also permit states at war to kill the enemy, the capture and 
 
79 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 724. 
80 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(7)(B); see also id. at § 1806(k)(1). 
81 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736-46, reversing In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (For. Intell. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
82 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736-46. 
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detention of enemy combatants is a more humane outcome that reduces the death and suffering 
of the battlefield. 
In the war against al Qaeda, the United States has encountered several categories of enemy 
combatants.  These categories are more numerous than might usually be the case due to al 
Qaeda’s stateless nature, which causes it to recruit operatives of different nationalities and to 
engage in offensive covert activities throughout the world.  The first category includes aliens 
captured and held outside the United States, such as the al Qaeda and Taliban fighters caught in 
Afghanistan and other operations abroad.  The second category includes United States citizens 
who have joined al Qaeda and have been captured abroad.  The third category includes aliens 
who have been detained within the United States, and the fourth category consists of United 
States persons, including both citizens and permanent resident aliens, who have been detained 
within the United States.  The first category would include the detainees currently being held at 
the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, none of whom are United States persons.83  The 
second category includes John Walker Lindh, captured in Afghanistan while fighting with the 
Taliban.  Lindh was returned to the United States, stood trial for supporting a foreign terrorist 
organization, and reached a plea agreement for 20 years of imprisonment.84  It also includes 
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Saudi Arabian citizen born in Louisiana, who was also captured in 
Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban.85  The third category includes Zacarias Moussaoui, who 
allegedly was part of the cell that carried out the September 11 hijackings and is currently on 
trial in Alexandria, Virginia for conspiracy to commit terrorist killings.86  The fourth includes 
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, captured attempting to enter Chicago from abroad with the 
purpose of furthering a plot to explode a radioactive dirty bomb.87 
The role of the courts in reviewing the detention of enemy combatants demonstrates the 
tension between judicial review and the usual judicial deference to political wartime decisions.  
In the first category, that of alien enemy combatants captured and held abroad, the courts 
historically have refused to exercise judicial review.88  In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Supreme 
Court refused to entertain a habeas petition brought by German World War II prisoners who 
challenged their trial and conviction by military commission for war crimes.89  Finding that 
Article III courts had no jurisdiction over their petition, the Court observed that “these prisoners 
 
83 Their cases are discussed in Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy v. 
Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002). 
84 Various aspects of Lindh’s prosecution are discussed in United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 
2002); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739 
(E.D. Va. 2002). 
85 Hamdi’s situation is discussed most recently in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc). 
86 United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, rehearing denied, 336 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003). 
87 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
88 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
89 Id. at 766-68. 
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at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the 
scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.”90  Further, judicial deference to the 
decisions of the political branches was warranted because “trials would hamper the war effort 
and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”91  Judicial proceedings would engender a “conflict 
between judicial and military opinion,” interfere with military operations by recalling personnel 
to testify, and “would diminish the prestige of” a field commander called "to account in his own 
civil courts” and would “divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the 
legal defensive at home.”92  In such cases, just as with the initiation of hostilities, judicial review 
has no role, as such decisions have been vested in the political branches and any exercise of 
jurisdiction would interfere with the conduct of military operations. 
In Al Odah v. United States, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit agreed that Johnson dictated that the al Qaeda and Taliban fighters held at 
Guantanamo Bay also remained beyond the reach of the Great Writ.93  Finding that the naval 
base in Cuba lay outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,94 Judge Randolph wrote 
for the panel that the petitioners, as aliens outside the United States with no constitutional rights, 
could not seek judicial review.  As Judge Randolph concluded, “[i]f the Constitution does not 
entitle the detainees to due process, and it does not, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of our 
courts to test the constitutionality or the legality of restraints on their liberty.”95  This result 
reaffirms the judiciary’s historical refusal to interfere in the decisions to initiate and conduct 
military hostilities, which the Constitution vests in the political branches. 
The other three categories of enemy combatants, however, do not fall within Johnson v. 
Eisentrager’s rule.  Americans detained abroad can seek judicial review of their detention,96 and 
there is no question that the writ of habeas corpus extends to both citizens and non-citizens 
detained within the territory of the United States.  While jurisdiction may exist, however, it is not 
clear what standards the courts will apply to review the government’s determination that a 
petitioner is an enemy combatant.  In both the  Hamdi and Padilla cases, no party has challenged 
the federal courts’ authority to decide the legal questions--the legal standard for status as an 
enemy combatant--de novo.  What remains at issue, however, is whether the federal courts must 
accept the facts as found by the executive branch, and whether it must adopt a deferential 
approach to the government’s application of the law to those facts.  In examining how the courts 
so far have wrestled with these questions, we can see that they are developing an approach, 
similar to the one in the surveillance context, which preserves judicial review while providing 
 
90 Id. at 778. 
91 Id. at 779. 
92 Id. 
93 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
94 Id. at 1142-44. 
95 Id. at 1141. 
96 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 11/3/2003  1:02 PM 
 TERRORISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 21 
the political branches with sufficient flexibility to perform their constitutional functions of 
fighting and winning a war. 
Before discussing the level of scrutiny, we should first make clear the legal context: the 
detention of enemy combatants regardless of citizenship or location of capture.  Usually, in the 
American experience, enemy combatants have been captured and detained abroad during combat 
on foreign battlefields with the U.S. Armed Forces.  The unconventional nature of the war with 
al Qaeda--its members are drawn from many nations, including the United States, and its 
operatives might be caught anywhere, including within the United States--means that the 
government may capture and detain enemy combatants within the United States itself.  While 
unusual, this is not unprecedented.  During the Civil War, for example, virtually every captured 
enemy combatant was an American citizen.  They did not fall within the Bill of Rights 
protections for criminal defendants because they were not detained as part of the criminal justice 
process; they were detained in combat.97  To be sure, there are limits to the Executive’s authority 
to detain American citizens as enemy combatants.  In Ex Parte Milligan, the Supreme Court 
ordered the release of an American citizen who had plotted to attack military installations and 
was detained by Union military authorities while “the courts are open and their process 
unobstructed.”98  Milligan, however, had been captured well away from the front, had never 
communicated with the enemy, and at best was merely a sympathizer with the Confederate 
cause.99  During World War II, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Quirin narrowed Milligan’s 
holding to cases in which the citizen had not associated in any way with the enemy armed 
forces.100  Quirin upheld the government’s trial by military commission of Nazi saboteurs who 
had infiltrated covertly into the United States and were caught by the FBI.101  Two of the Nazi 
saboteurs appeared to be American citizens, but the Court brushed aside this fact, holding that 
the government could detain enemy combatants regardless of whether they were citizens or not:  
“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him of the 
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful[.]”102  Milligan was not an enemy combatant 
subject to detention under the laws of war because he, “not being a part of or associated with the 
armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent[.]”103  Once properly designated an enemy 
belligerent, however, even an American citizen may be detained and tried by military 
commission, rather than enjoy the benefits of the criminal procedures established by the Bill of 
Rights and subject to judicial review. 
In reviewing the legal question of the President’s power de novo, both the Hamdi and 
 
97 See WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (10th ed. 1864). 
98 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). 
99 Id. at 131. 
 
100 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942). 
101 Id. at 20-23, 48. 
102 Id. at 37. 
103 Id. at 45. 
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Padilla courts agreed that the President’s war power to detain enemy combatants extended to 
citizens.  As noted earlier, both courts accepted, without question, the political branches’ 
decision that the conflict with al Qaeda was a war, and both found no quarrel with the conclusion 
that this state of war enabled the President to detain members of the enemy pursuant to his war 
powers.  In this respect, the courts have followed the historical practice of complete judicial 
deference on the question of going to war.  The crucial question remains, however, what standard 
of review will the courts exercise over the facts of an individual detention and the application of 
law to those facts.  In a regular habeas case, for example, a federal court reviewing a purely 
executive detention (rather than, as is usually the case, detention and conviction of a criminal 
defendant by the state courts) might exercise de novo review of the facts.  If the executive 
claimed, for example, that an individual had to be detained because he posed an imminent threat 
to public safety,104 a judge might feel it necessary to examine witnesses in court and to directly 
review the records of the detention.  In war time, however, as Johnson v. Eisentrager so vividly 
explained, such judicial intrusiveness could threaten to interfere with ongoing military 
operations.  It is worth quoting the relevant passage from Eisentrager at length: 
 
The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies 
during active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace.  Such trials 
 would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.  They would 
diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering 
neutrals.  It would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field commander 
than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to 
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military 
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.  Nor is it unlikely that the result of such 
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly 
comforting to enemies of the United States.105 
 
Add to these concerns the important military interest, only made more acute by the 
unconventional nature of the war with al Qaeda, of interrogating enemy combatants for 
information about coming attacks.  Under this understanding of war, de novo judicial review 
threatens to undermine the very effectiveness of the military effort against al Qaeda.  A habeas 
proceeding could become the forum for recalling commanders and intelligence operatives from 
the field into open court; disrupting overt and covert operations; revealing successful military 
tactics and methods; and forcing the military to shape its activities to the demands of the judicial 
process.  Indeed, the discovery orders of the trial judge in Hamdi threatened to achieve exactly 
 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (“in times of war or insurrection, when society’s 
interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous.”); 
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1909) (governor’s detention of individual because of insurrection).. 
105 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950). 
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these results. 
In Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson, writing for a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel, recognized the 
potentially conflicting approaches to judicial review in wartime.  After reviewing the 
Constitution’s allocation of war powers to the political branches and the functional superiority of 
the President and Congress in waging war, Judge Wilkinson observed that “[i]n accordance with 
this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches 
when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national 
security, or military affairs.”106  These interests are  at their zenith when the President makes 
decisions with regard to the capture of enemy combatants in a zone of active hostilities.  At the 
same time, however, Judge Wilkinson affirmed the judiciary’s role in reviewing detentions by 
the government, even those that occur during wartime:  “The duty of the judicial branch to 
protect our individual freedoms does not simply cease whenever our military forces are 
committed by the political branches to armed conflict.”107  In reviewing the district court’s order 
for production of witnesses and documents, the Fourth Circuit rejected a de novo standard of 
review of the facts as too intrusive into the political branches’ management of war.  “The factual 
inquiry upon which Hadmi would lead us, if it did not entail disclosure of sensitive intelligence, 
might require an excavation of facts buried under the rubble of war.  The cost of such an inquiry 
in terms of the efficiency and moral of American forces cannot be disregarded.”108   
 In deciding whether to accept the government’s account of the facts, the court was 
confronted with an affidavit by Michael Mobbs, a Defense Department official that outlined the 
basic circumstances of Hamdi’s capture and activities.109  The Court held that these statements 
“are sufficient to confirm that Hamdi’s detention conforms with a legitimate exercise of the war 
powers given the executive by” the Constitution.110  The government further argued that no 
further factual inquiry was required, and suggested that the courts adopt a “some evidence” 
standard to govern review of enemy combatant determinations.111  In the immigration context, 
for example, courts have upheld deportation orders--another area of primary executive branch 
responsibility involving considerations of foreign affairs and national security--so long as “there 
was some evidence to support” the “factual determinations made by the Executive.”112  The 
Fourth Circuit ultimately found further review to be unnecessary due to the concession by 
Hamdi’s counsel that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan with a weapon fighting for the 
 
106 Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
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112 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001); see also Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 312 (1946); Fernandez v. 
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). 
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Taliban.113  The Court found that these uncontroverted facts clearly satisfied the legal test for 
enemy combatant status, and the writ was dismissed.114 
 Jose Padilla’s counsel, unlike Hamdi’s, did not concede facts that showed her client to be a 
member of al Qaeda.  As a result, Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York had to 
confront the standard of review question avoided by the Fourth Circuit.115  News coverage has 
focused on the court’s order that Padilla be permitted access to a lawyer, which the government 
has appealed to the Second Circuit.116  Despite finding that Padilla had no right to counsel in 
habeas proceedings, nor a Fifth or Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to the non-criminal 
nature of the proceedings, the Court concluded that access to counsel was necessary in order to 
allow Padilla to present any facts that might controvert the government’s case.117  This apparent 
defeat for the government notwithstanding, it is important to realize how much of the 
government’s position Judge Mukasey accepted.  Like the Fourth Circuit, this court deferred to 
the political branches’ determination to wage war.  It found that the President’s war power 
included the authority to detain members of the enemy, including American citizens; that this 
power extended to the capture of al Qaeda operatives within the United States; and as a result, 
that enemy combatants could be detained until the end of the conflict without criminal 
charges.118 
 Most importantly, for our purposes, the court agreed that substantial deference was owed the 
political branches in the exercise of the war power.  “The ‘political branches,’ when they make 
judgments on the exercise of war powers under Articles I and II, as both branches have here, 
need not submit those judgments to review by Article III courts.  Rather, they are subject to the 
perhaps less didactic but nonetheless searching audit of the democratic process.”119  As a result 
of the Constitution’s division of authority over war, the court rejected the argument that it should 
conduct a de novo review of Padilla’s association with al Qaeda.  Instead, the court believed its 
inquiry was limited to “whether there is some evidence to support [the President’s] conclusion 
that Padilla was, like the German saboteurs in Quirin, engaged in a mission against the United 
States on behalf of an enemy with whom the United States is at war[.]”120  Thus, the only setback 
for the government in its litigation over enemy combatants--and a limited setback at that--the 
federal court’s adoption of a deferential standard that accommodates judicial review while 
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acknowledging  the primacy of the political branches concerning the conduct of war. 
 In this respect, the Padilla court reflects the balance struck between judicial review and the 
imperatives and exigencies of war.  Courts have refused to second-guess the determination of the 
political branches to go to war, and instead have limited the scope of their review to the domestic 
ramifications of the legal status of war.  Thus, they have dismissed cases questioning the conduct 
of the war abroad.  Even with domestic cases, such as those involving surveillance or detention 
of terrorists, the courts have exercised judicial review quite differently than the de novo review 
commonly seen in peacetime, non-foreign affairs cases.  Instead, the courts have proven quite 
deferential to the political branches in a clear effort to accommodate judicial review to the 
compelling governmental interests in conducting and winning a war. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Whether the federal courts may refuse to enforce unconstitutional actions by the other 
branches of government is a question that has been with us since the origins of the Constitution.  
Recently, it has re-appeared because of the Rehnquist Court’s interest in federalism.  This paper 
has explored judicial review’s provenance in a wholly different area, that of the separation of 
powers generally, and war powers specifically.  Here, the courts historically have refused to 
adjudicate disputes over which branch may initiate military hostilities abroad, a result produced 
by the Constitution’s textual allocation of war powers to the political branches and its structural 
failure to define a specific process for warmaking.  Nonetheless, courts continue to play a role in 
war by hearing cases involving the domestic ramifications of a decision that the United States is 
in a state of war.  Yet, as we have seen with cases involving the surveillance and detention of 
terrorists, courts have adopted a deferential standard of scrutiny that provides the political 
branches with the flexibility to conduct war successfully. 
 By doing so, the exercise of judicial review is playing more than its usual role as a check and 
balance on the actions of the other branches.  Rather, judicial review presents the President and 
Congress with new weapons with which to fight the war on terrorism.  In the case of FISA 
surveillance, for example, deferential judicial review allows the executive branch to intercept 
terrorist communications under a standard similar to that which applies to military surveillance, 
all the while preserving the possibility of the use of the evidence in a federal prosecution.  With 
its deferential review toward the detention of enemy combatants, federal courts not only provide 
the executive with a different way of holding terrorists, but they also present the option, perhaps, 
of later moving the detainees into the federal court system for prosecution.  In both cases, the 
more deferential standard of scrutiny allows the political branches to undertake immediate 
wartime actions under the more flexible rules of the laws of war, without forsaking later use of 
the federal criminal justice system as means of sanctioning and incapacitating members of al 
Qaeda.  By presenting more options to the warfighting branches of government, the courts act 
not merely as a traditional check on government, but as a potential weapon that can assist the 
United States’ war on terrorism. 
